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In Britain’s first past the post electoral system, some votes are
worth 22 times more than others
Britain’s electoral landscape is dominated by safe seats, with very little competition for votes taking place within
them. New research, presented here by Chris Terry of the Electoral Reform society, shows the enormous
differences between the ‘cost’ of votes in different constituencies, calling into question the premise that all
votes are equal.
A well-known
f eature of
Britain’s First
Past the Post
electoral system
that it divides
the country into
saf e and
marginal
constituencies.
Saf e seats have
almost no
chance of
switching hands
and while they
are occasionally
lost, such
events are
notable f or their
rarity. It is also
well known that
parties target
their resources
on the most marginal constituencies, a logical practice given the twin pressures of  limited resources and an
electoral system that creates such a large number of  saf e seats.
It is possible to establish the degree of  dif f erence between marginal seats and saf e, with regards to how
much value is placed on them by parties. A solid measure f or this is how much money parties spend
campaigning in them. How much do polit ical campaigns value a vote in each of  the 650 constituencies which
make up the United Kingdom? The Electoral Ref orm Society’s new report “Penny f or your vote? Counting
the cost of  an unf air electoral system” calculates the answer through an in-depth analysis of  Electoral
Commission data on campaign expenditure in 2010.
Our research f ound that votes in the most valued seat, Luton South, where worth £3.07 each – 22 times
that of  the least valued seat, Bootle, where votes were valued at just 14p. The seats with the highest
spending per vote – constituencies like Hampstead and Kilburn, Brighton Pavilion, and Norwich South –
were contested by a multitude of  parties, with strong campaigns f rom minor party or independent
candidates. Those seats with the smallest amount of  spending per vote – f or example Halton, Ruislip
Northwood and Pinner and Shef f ield Heeley – were all ultra-saf e.
The table below demonstrates the disparity between campaigning in the 50 least and most marginal seats.
The top 50 closest seats ended up with an average majority of  only 1.3%, while the bottom 50 had a
majority of  41.9%. Average spending per vote in the top 50 was 162% higher than in the bottom 50.
Spending on advertising per vote was two thirds higher, and spending on public meetings was 85% higher.
Average spending per vote on leaf lets was 188% higher in the closest 50.
We f ound that in 195 seats (30% of  the total) no money was spent on public meetings by any candidate. In
those seats the average majority was f our points higher. In f ive seats nothing was spent on advertising. Of
these f ive seats only one, Knowsley, had any money (£40) spent on public meetings at all.
These f igures ref lect the reality of  a system where your vote counts more depending on where you live. As
the loss of  saf e seats is rare, parties target resources on a small number of  f loating voters in marginal
seats. This means that some voters are much more valued by the parties than others, calling into question
the f undamental principle of  democracy – that all votes are created equal.
There is much evidence that suggests marginal seats experience higher turnouts at elections. For instance,
Democratic Audit demonstrated that turnout was 9.2% higher in the most marginal seats when compared to
the saf est seats. Polit ical scientists such as Alan Gerber in the US and David Cutts here have also
demonstrated a link between voter contact and turnout. A leaf let, a poster, or a knock on the door f rom an
activist not only acts to persuade voters to vote f or a particular party – it also reminds them to vote at all.
Using our data we were able to show a correlation between the money spent by candidates in a
constituency, and the voter turnout in that seat. Indeed, the correlation was remarkably strong. This link
suggests that one of  the results of  our f irst-past- the-post system is that it lowers voter turnouts. By
creating saf e seats where parties (whether incumbent in the seat or not) do not bother to campaign, the
system creates voters who consequently do not bother to vote.
It is no wonder that voters f eel disengaged f rom polit ics when the electoral system causes parties to
behave in this way. The number of  marginal seats is shrinking, f rom more than 150 bef ore 1974 to 85 in
2010. Combine this with f alling membership of  parties and an increasingly volatile party f unding base, and it
suggests that targeting of  marginal seats will become even more prolif ic in the f uture. Af ter all, polit ical
party resources are increasingly scant, and they cannot af f ord to ‘waste’ them in areas in which the result
is a f oregone conclusion.
Our electoral system creates the ult imate postcode lottery, where your votes could count more or less
depending on where you happen to live. We need to change our party f unding system so that we have
properly f unded parties able to campaign f or votes across the country. And we need to change our voting
system so that ultra-saf e seats can be made a thing of  the past.
Note: This post represents the views of the author and not of Democratic Audit or the LSE. Please read our
comments policy before posting.
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